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JURISDICTION
This Court has statutory jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal

where the notice of appeal was filed over thirteen months after
the action was dismissed, and almost nine months after entry of
an order denying a Rule 60 motion to set aside the dismissal.
This Court reviews the record de novo on jurisdictional issues.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d

849

(Utah 1983); Anderson v.

Anderson. 282 P.2d 845 (Utah 1955).
2.

Whether the trial court acted within its discretion in

denying the Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment.

This

Court will reverse that ruling only if it is clear that the trial
court abused its broad discretion in ruling on relief from a
judgment.

Russell v. Martell. 681 P. 2d 1193, 1194-95 (Utah

1984) .
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
(a) Appeal from final judgment and
order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial
court to the appellate court, the notice of
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 3 0
days after the date of entry of the judgment
or order appealed from. * * *

1

Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors therein arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such
notice, if any, as the court orders. During
the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding
for
the
following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly
discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is
no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (7) any
other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than
3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation.
This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment,

2

order or proceeding or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court.
The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
* * *

(2) If a certificate of readiness for
trial has not been served and filed within
180 days of the filing date and absent a
showing of good cause, the court shall
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack
of prosecution.
Rule 4-502, Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
(1) Parties conducting discovery under
Rules 33, 34 and 3 6 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not file discovery
requests with the clerk of the court, but
shall file only the original certificate of
service stating that the discovery requests
have been served on the other parties and
the date of service. The responding party
shall file a similar certificate with the
clerk of the court. * * *
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of
the circuit court. * * *
Statement of the Rule:
(1)

Filing and
memoranda•

service

of

motions

and

(a) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All motions, except uncontested or exparte matters, shall be accompanied by
a memorandum of points and authorities,
appropriate affidavits, and copies of
or citations by page number to relevant
3

portions of depositions, exhibits or
other documents relied upon in support
of the motion. * * *
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Phelps and Carlson

["plaintiffs"] filed this action on

February 25, 1987, against Sears and nine individual Sears
employees ["defendants"] alleging emotional distress, wrongful
discharge, defamation, and racketeering arising out of plaintiffs' employment as sales persons at Sears and their terminations on September 24, 1986.

(R. 2-12).

Over the next seven months, an Amended Complaint and Second
Amended Complaint deleted three of the nine individual Sears
employees and added two more state law counts arising from the
terminations.

(R. 125-155).

Also, in November of 1987, plaintiffs sued Sears in United
States District Court for the District of Utah alleging age and
sex discrimination in violation of federal law, Civil No. 87-C1014S. Discovery was completed in that action on April 30, 1990.
On August 16, 1990, Judge David Sam granted summary judgment for
Sears on all claims, finding that plaintiffs were not harassed in
the work place because of age or sex, and that plaintiffs' terminations were not because of age or sex but because of plaintiffs'
insubordination and willful disobedience of rules. Plaintiffs'
appeal from the summary judgment is now pending before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

4

Because the federal action and the instant state action
involve the same facts, plaintiffs and defendants agreed through
counsel that discovery in either action could apply to the other
action.

However, defendants are unaware of any order from the

Federal District Court that discovery in the federal case would
be applicable to the state action as asserted in plaintiffs'
brief, page 3.

Further, no such agreement purported to relieve

plaintiffs of their duty to prosecute the instant action in a
timely manner or to inform the trial judge of the progress of
discovery.
The last indication in the record of pretrial discovery is
defendants' certificate of service of responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents, dated May 4, 1990.
(R. 212).
On February 22, 1991, at a hearing on the court's own motion
and order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute, the court ordered:
Based on the motion of counsel for the
plaintiff, the court orders the court's own
order to show cause be continued 45 days for
certification or be dismissed. (R. 218).
No certification of readiness for trial was filed, nor did
plaintiffs file any explanation for such failure, until after the
action was dismissed.
The next entry in the record is the court's order of
dismissal of April 22, 1991, for failure to prosecute.

5

(R. 219).

On March 6, 1991, plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the
order of dismissal, asserting that Rule 60(a) allows relief from
judgments or orders where clerical mistakes or other errors
arising from oversight or omission are made, and asserting that
Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order in the
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
[This language is from Rule 60(b)(1)].

(R. 221-226).

In this motion, plaintiffs spent several pages explaining
that they had not filed a certificate of readiness for trial
within 45 days as ordered by the court at the hearing on order to
show cause because they were awaiting discovery responses from
defendants which were not yet due because plaintiffs delayed five
full weeks after the order to show cause hearing before serving
the discovery.

After the hearing of February 22, 1991, in which

the court allowed 45 days for plaintiffs to file certification or
readiness for trial, or in the alternative face dismissal, plaintiffs delayed until March 29, 1991, before serving additional
discovery on defendants.

Plaintiffs7 explanation stated that a

certificate of service of discovery was filed on March 29, 1991.
No such certificate of service appears in the court record.
Plaintiffs further stated that they were awaiting responses to
this discovery when they received the court's order of dismissal.
(R. 221-226).
This motion was signed by counsel but was not in affidavit
form and no affidavit was provided, although plaintiffs asserted
facts in the motion which did not otherwise appear on the record.
6

Defendants objected to setting aside the dismissal, filed
May 6, 1991.

(R. 227-229).

On September 5, 1991, four months later, plaintiffs filed a
notice to submit for decision their motion to set aside the
dismissal [mailed September 3, 1991].

(R. 232-233).

The court denied the motion to set aside dismissal, citing
the reasons specified in plaintiffs7 motion and in the objection
thereto, and noting that the motion was insufficient as no
supporting affidavit was submitted.

(R. 234-236).

Five months later, on February 25, 1992, plaintiffs filed a
second motion to set aside the order of dismissal.
stated that it was based on Rule 60(b)(7).

The motion

However, the

accompanying affidavit and memorandum made the same arguments as
in the first motion.

(R. 237-251).

Defendants filed an objection on March 2, 1992, pointing out
that the second motion asserted the same factual grounds as the
first motion, and separate successive motions on the same grounds
should not be allowed; and that the motion actually stated a
claim under Rule 60(b)(1), for which the three-month time for
filing had expired.

(R. 252-255).

On May 13, 1992, the court denied the second motion to set
aside order of dismissal, and entered an order on its decision on
May 28, 1992.

(R. 256, 259-260).

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on June 24, 1992, from
the order entered May 28, 1992, denying the second motion to set
aside order of dismissal.

(R. 261-262).
7

Plaintiffs never appealed from the order of dismissal itself
or from the order denying their first motion to set aside order
of dismissal.
Objection to Plaintiffs7 Statement of the Case
Plaintiffs assert that on March 29, 1991, interrogatories
and requests for production of documents were served on defendants, and a certificate of service was filed with the court, and
that defendants' response was due April 28, 1991.

In fact, no

certificate of service of discovery was filed with the court, as
the court record clearly shows.
The discovery was served by mail on defendants on March 29,
1991, and a certificate of service was served on defendants.
However, no certificate was filed with the court as required by
the Code of Judicial Administration.

[The certificate of service

from defendants' files is included in the addendum to this
brief].
Since plaintiffs did not comply with the rule requiring
filing of certificate of service of discovery with the court, the
court had no way to know from the record that discovery was outstanding when it dismissed the action on its own motion for
failure to prosecute.
Further, after apparently representing to the court at the
hearing on February 22, 1991, that they could have their case
ready for certification in 45 days, plaintiffs delayed 35 days,
until March 29, to serve by mail discovery requests which under
their own terms were not due for a response for another 3 3 days
8

(Rule 33(a) and Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), a
total of 68 days, which was 23 days or over three weeks beyond
the extension of 45 days granted by the trial judge.
Therefore, plaintiffs' assertion that the dismissal of the
case was ordered six days prior to the deadline for response to
the discovery requests is incorrect.

The dismissal was entered

April 22, 1991, and the discovery requests were due May 1, nine
days later, but only because of plaintiffs' own delay in serving
the requests.
Disposition in Court Below
The trial court, Hon. J. Dennis Frederick, dismissed this
action on the court's own motion, for failure to prosecute on
April 22, 1991, after plaintiffs failed to file a certification
of readiness for trial after the action had been pending four
years and two months, and after the court had ordered plaintiffs
two months previously to file a certification of readiness for
trial within 45 days or face dismissal.

The court entered its

order denying plaintiffs' motion to set aside the dismissal on
October 1, 1991.

The court entered its order denying a second

motion by plaintiffs to set aside order of dismissal on May 28,
1992. On June 24, 1992, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal,
appealing only from the judgment of May 28, 1992, denying their
second Rule 60 motion.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Defendants respectfully request this Court to enter its
judgment and order that plaintiffs have deprived the court of
9

jurisdiction by failing to file timely appeal from the order of
dismissal and from the order denying the first motion to set
aside dismissal.
Defendants

filed a motion for summary disposition and

memorandum of points and authorities on this issue pursuant to
Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Court

denied

that motion

and

deferred

any

The Utah Supreme
ruling

on the

jurisdiction issue until plenary presentation and consideration
of the case.

(Order of October 28, 1992) .

See Isaacson v.

Dorius, 669 P.2d 849, 850 (Utah 1983).
Alternatively, defendants request the Court to affirm the
trial court's order denying plaintiffs' second motion to set
aside order of dismissal, which was the only order appealed from.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

There is no jurisdiction for this appeal because

the notice of appeal was filed nine months after the order
denying the first Rule 60 motion. A second successive Rule 60(b)
motion cannot be used to create an appeal. The order of October
1, 1991, denying the first Rule 60(b) motion was a final appealable order. Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the time for appeal by
filing a second successive motion because the second motion was
barred by the law of the case.
Both motions were in substance Rule 60(b)(1) motions based
on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, despite
plaintiffs7 attempt to title the second motion as a Rule 60(b)(7)

10

motion.

The substance of pleadings prevails over any inconsis-

tent title or label assigned to them.
POINT II. The appeal from the denial of plaintiffs' second
Rule 60 motion should be denied because that motion was barred by
plaintiffs' failure to file it within three months after the
order of dismissal was entered.
February

18, 1992, almost

The second motion was filed

ten months

after

the

order of

dismissal. Its substance was a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Therefore,
the second motion was filed beyond the three-month limit provided
in Rule 60(b).
POINT III. Even if the second motion could be characterized
properly as a Rule 60(b)(7) motion, the court acted within its
broad discretion in concluding that it was not filed within a
reasonable time as required by the rule.
POINT IV.

This court is without jurisdiction over any

appeal from the dismissal of the action itself because there was
no timely appeal from the order of dismissal.

The action was

dismissed on April 22, 1991. Appellants filed a motion on May 3,
1991, which appellants now characterize as a Rule 60(a) motion.
(Brief of Appellants, p. 4). However, motions under Rule 60(a)
do not suspend the time for appeal from the original order of
dismissal.
Further, the May 1991 motion was in fact a Rule 60(b) motion
in form and substance.

Rule 60(b) expressly provides that a

motion under that subdivision does not affect the finality of a

11

judgment.

Consequently, the time for appeal from the order of

dismissal expired May 22, 1991.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to use Rule 60 motions as a
substitute for appeal, in an attempt to circumvent the result of
their

failure to

file a timely

appeal

from

the

order of

dismissal. The thrust of both of plaintiffs' Rule 60 motions was
that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the
action.

Alleged judicial error is a subject which should have

been addressed in a direct appeal from the order of dismissal,
and not through a Rule 60 motion.

Appeal from denial of a Rule

60 motion brings up for review only the correctness of the order
denying the Rule 60 motion, and does not bring up for review the
judgment from which relief is sought.
POINT V.

The court acted within the range of its broad

discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute and
in denying plaintiffs' motions for relief from the dismissal.
Plaintiffs had delayed four years and two months without filing
a certificate of readiness for trial.

There was no certificate

of service of any discovery in the court record for over a year
before dismissal. At the order to show cause hearing on February
22, 1991, they promised the court they would file a certificate
of readiness for trial within 45 days or face dismissal.

They

filed no certificate of readiness for trial at all, and after two
months, the court dismissed their action.
Subsequently, on their first Rule 60 motion, plaintiffs
asserted incorrectly that a certificate of service of discovery
12

had been filed in the court record.
assertion under oath.
why they delayed

They declined to make that

Further, they offered no explanation for

35 days after the hearing

before filing

discovery requests, when they knew that by doing so, there was no
way the discovery could be answered within the 45-day limit to
which plaintiffs had agreed at the order to show cause hearing.
The court was entitled to conclude that plaintiffs' neglect was
serious and purposeful, and not excusable under the requirements
of Rule 60(b)(1).
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THERE IS NO JURISDICTION FOR THIS APPEAL
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS FILED NINE
MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER DENYING THE FIRST
RULE 60 MOTION, WHICH WAS A FINAL APPEALABLE
ORDER.
Plaintiffs appeal from the court's order of May 28, 1992,
denying their second Rule 60 motion.

However, eight months

before this order, the court had entered its order denying
plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion, on October 1, 1991. That order
was a final appealable order. Plaintiffs7 failure to file timely
notice

of

appeal

from

the

October

1,

1991

order

is

jurisdictional.
This issue is controlled by the opinion in Arnica Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 968-70 (Utah App. 1989).

In that

case, Schettler filed a Rule 60 motion which was denied, and no
appeal was taken.

Schettler filed a second motion, asserting

generally the same grounds for post-trial relief.
13

The second

motion was denied, and Schettler appealed from the denial of the
second motion.

The court held that the order denying the first

motion was a final appealable order, and since Schettler had not
timely appealed that order, his appeal from the order denying the
second motion did not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals.
The opinion noted that the additional information included
in the second Rule 60 motion was available to Schettler at the
time he filed his first motion and with due diligence could have
been included in the original motion.

The court disapproved of

successive post-judgment motions.
The opinion restated well-settled Utah law that an order
denying relief under Rule 60(b) is a final appealable order.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987).

The opinion

concluded that the time for filing a notice of appeal on the
first Rule 60(b) motion continued to run from the order denying
that motion. Consequently, the Court could not take jurisdiction
over

an

appeal

which

was

not

timely

brought

before

it.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed Schettler's appeal.
In the instant case, plaintiffs7 first motion to set aside
order of dismissal recites that it is based upon Rule 60(b) . (R.
221).

On the next page, the motion states:
Rule 60(a) allows relief from judgments or
orders where clerical mistakes or other
errors arising from oversight or omission
are made. In addition, Rule 60(b) provides
for relief from a judgment or order in the
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect. Based upon the following
14

discussion, the order of dismissal in this
case should be set aside.
(R. 222).

The motion then continues to attempt to explain

plaintiffs7 neglect in allowing the case to remain in discovery
over four years, and in overlooking or ignoring the court's
deadline for filing a certificate of readiness for trial. These
are matters expressly within the scope of Rule 60(b)(1).

That

motion was denied by order of October 1, 1991, and no appeal was
taken.
On February 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed a second motion,
together with an affidavit and memorandum.

The second motion

recited that it was based upon Rule 60(b)(7).

(R. 237).

However, the factual presentation and argument for relief in the
affidavit and memorandum are essentially the same as those urged
in the first motion.

The memorandum in support of the second

motion even goes so far as to allege the same identical grounds
for relief as those asserted in the first motion:

"In addition,

Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order in the
event of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."
(R. 240).

These are the grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1),

which were the grounds for the first motion.
Most importantly, the substance and content of the two
motions is essentially the same.

The second motion is nothing

more than an attempt to re-argue matters already settled by the
court when it denied the first motion.
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In an attempt to avoid dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
plaintiffs have attempted to label their second motion as a Rule
60(b)(7) motion. However, where the nature of the second motion
is essentially the same as the first motion, appeal will not be
allowed where the time for appeal from denial of the first motion
has expired. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d at 968970.
The nature of a motion ascertained from the substance of the
instrument will control the court's treatment of the motion over
any inconsistent caption or title. Darrinaton v. Wade, 812 P.2d
452, 457 (Utah App. 1991) (Materials filed in opposition to
default judgment would be treated as Rule 60(b) motion to set
aside default judgment, although not titled as such); Watkiss &
Campbell v. Foa and Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Utah 1991)
(Motion for reconsideration filed after summary judgment treated
as Rule 59 motion for new trial); Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d
816 (Utah 1990) (Motion for relief from judgment treated as Rule
59 motion); Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 134748 (Utah 1983) (Motion for re-hearing treated as motion under
Rule 52 or Rule 59); Howard v. Howard. 356 P.2d 275, 276-77 (Utah
1960) ("Notice of intention to move for new trial" treated as
motion for new trial where the document met the basic requirement
of advising the opponent and the court of the issues raised).
Subparagraph (7) may not be resorted to for relief when the
ground

asserted

for

relief

falls within

subparagraph (1).

Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1984) (Delay is a
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60(b)(1) issue, in spite of movant's attempt to characterize it
as 60(b)(7); Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d
429 (Utah 1982); Calder Bros. Co, v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 92627 (Utah 1982); Pitts v. McLachlan. 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977).
The above cases also stand for the rule that unexplained
delays by counsel are Rule 60(b)(1) matters.

In this case,

plaintiffs' explanation in both of the Rule 60 motions was that
(1) discovery in this case was neglected or delayed because
discovery was proceeding in the federal action; (2) the discovery
requests served on March 29, 1991, were not due for response by
the 45-day deadline plaintiffs had agreed to because plaintiffs
delayed in filing the discovery requests; and (3) the court
should have known that there was outstanding discovery because
plaintiffs filed a certificate of service, when in fact no such
certificate was filed, apparently through mistake, inadvertence,
or neglect.
These explanations are precisely the reasons specified in
subparagraph (1) : "Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect."

No timely appeal was filed from the denial of the

first Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
Although plaintiffs attempt on appeal to characterize their
first Rule 60 motion as a motion to correct clerical mistake
under Rule 60(a), the substance of the motion itself and Utah
case law decisions show that the motion was made under Rule
60(b)(1) governing mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.
17

In Richards v. Siddowav. 471 P.2d 143 (Utah 1970) , the court
held that there was no clerical error where the substance of the
judgment of the trial court did not follow the stipulated
agreement of the parties•

The court observed:

The distinction between a judicial error and
clerical error does not depend upon who made
it. Rather, it depends on whether it was
made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 46 Am.Jur.2d
Judgments, § 202.
471 P.2d at 145.
When this standard is applied to the instant case, it is
clear that plaintiffs7 dispute is with the decision to render the
judgment, which was not a clerical function at all. There is no
dispute that the order of dismissal in fact was recorded by the
clerk in the same form in which it was rendered by the trial
judge. Variance in this aspect would create clerical error, but
that did not occur in this case.
In Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the court
held that there was no clerical error when the trial judge signed
and entered an order of dismissal with prejudice, which one of
the parties later claimed should more properly have been entered
without prejudice.
above

from

The opinion quoted the same language quoted

Richards

v.

Siddowav,

and

noted

further

that

correction for clerical error is limited to the purpose of
reflecting the actual intention of the court and parties.

The

court noted that Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of
a substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is
18

unilateral. The order of dismissal in the instant case does not
contain any proper ground for relief because of clerical mistake.
More important, the substance of plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion
does not involve any argument for the kind of relief which could
be awarded because of clerical mistake in a proper case.
Plaintiffs' first Rule 60 motion was exclusively or in
substantial part a Rule 60(b) motion.

It was denied and no

timely appeal was filed from the denial.
POINT II,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS'
SECOND RULE 60 MOTION BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
BROUGHT WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL WAS ENTERED.
The second Rule 60 motion was in substance a Rule 60(b)(1)
motion, required by the rule to be filed not more than three
months after the judgment or order was entered.
The order of dismissal was entered February 22, 1991. The
second motion was filed February 18, 1992, almost 10 months after
the order of dismissal.

Therefore, the second motion was filed

beyond the three-month limit provided in Rule 60(b), and the
trial court was correct in denying the motion on that ground.
Utah law is clear that parties may not avoid the three-month
limitation

imposed

on

relief

under

subparagraph

(1)

characterizing the post-trial motion under subparagraph

by
(7) .

Further, unexplained delays by counsel of the sort engaged in by
plaintiffs in this case are Rule 60(b)(1) matters for which the
motion must be filed within three months after the judgment or
19

order.

Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); Gardiner

and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); Calder
Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d

922

(Utah 1982); Pitts v.

McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977).
Plaintiffs

cannot

avoid

the

three-month

time

limit

requirement by characterizing their second motion as a Rule
60(b)(7) motion.

Their second motion was filed beyond the time

limit established in Rule 60, and the trial court properly denied
it for that reason.
POINT III.
EVEN IP THE SECOND MOTION COULD BE
CHARACTERIZED PROPERLY AS A RULE 60(b)(7)
MOTION, THE COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD
DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS NOT
FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED
BY THE RULE.
Rule 60 requires that motions under subparagraph (7) for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment" must be made "within a reasonable time."
In this case, the second Rule 60 motion was filed almost 10
months after the order of dismissal.

The second motion stated

essentially the same grounds which were asserted in the first
motion, filed 11 days after the order of dismissal.

This shows

that all facts known and available to plaintiffs to argue in
support of their second motion were equally known and available
at the time they filed their first motion.

There was no

justification for the delay in filing the second motion. Also,
the affidavit in support of the second motion does not offer any
20

explanation or justification for the delay in filing the second
motion.

(R. 247-250).

Plaintiffs seek to excuse their delay in filing the second
motion by asserting that five months of the delay were consumed
by the trial court's own delay in ruling on the first Rule 60
motion.

(Brief of Appellants, p. 7, 13). However, plaintiffs

neglect to mention that it was plaintiffs themselves who failed
to file a notice to submit their motion for decision during that
time.

Plaintiffs filed their first motion on May 3, 1991, and

neglected to file a notice to submit for decision until September
5, 1991.

The court decided the motion the next day by minute

entry on September 6, 1991. Under those circumstances, it hardly
seems fair for plaintiffs to blame the court for the delay.
Further, if plaintiffs' second motion was based on separate
grounds from their first motion, as they assert, then they had no
reason to await decision on the first motion before filing for
relief on separate grounds in the second motion.
The trial court was entitled to find within its broad
discretion

that

the

second

motion

reasonable time.
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was

not

made

within a

POINT IV.
THERE IS NO JURISDICTION OVER ANY APPEAL
FROM A DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ITSELF
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO TIMELY APPEAL FROM THE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL.
THE ONLY PURPORTED
APPEAL IS FROM THE ORDER DENYING THE SECOND
RULE 60 MOTION.
Plaintiffs assert and argue in their brief that the district
court's dismissal of this action was an abuse of discretion. The
order of dismissal itself is not appealable because the time for
appeal from the order has expired.
If this Court reaches the merits of plaintiffs' claim that
the denial of their second Rule 60 motion was an abuse of
discretion, this

Court

should

differentiate

cautiously

the

grounds for a claim of abuse of discretion with respect to the
Rule 60 motion, as opposed to the grounds for the order of
dismissal itself.
Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for appeal.
Anderson, 282 P.2d 845, 847 (Utah 1955).

Anderson v.

In particular, relief

under the residual clause of Rule 60(b)(7) [identical to 60(b)(6)
in the Federal Rules] is unavailable where a party could have
filed an appeal and chose not to do so. 7 J. Moore and J. Lucas,
Moore's Federal Practice & Procedure, pp. 141-142, 269 (2d ed.
1992); 11 Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure, pp. 214-215

(1973; 1992 Annot.);

see

Ackermann v. United States. 340 U.S. 193 (1950); Goodwin v. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.. 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Judicial error may not be asserted as a ground for relief
under Rule 60(b) , at least after the time for appeal has run.
7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moored Federal Practice & Procedure, p.
330 (2d ed. 1992); Wagner v. United States. 316 F.2d 871 (2nd
Cir. 1963),
Rule 60(a) motions to correct clerical errors do not suspend
the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal.

United

States v. 1431.80 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Cross County,
Ark. , 466 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1972); Moored Federal Practice, 2d
ed., Vol. 6A, p. 60-56 (1992).
If this court reaches the merits of the trial courts denial
of plaintiffs' second Rule 60 motion, this Court should evaluate
that decision based on the broad discretion of the trial court
with respect to the motion itself, based on the circumstances
before the court at the time of the motion.
POINT V.
THE COURT ACTED WITHIN THE RANGE OP ITS
BROAD DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM THE
DISMISSAL.
There was a substantial record to support the trial judge's
dismissal

of

the

action without

prejudice

for

failure to

prosecute.
Plaintiffs filed their action on February 25, 1987.
Rule 4-103(2) provides:
If a certificate of readiness for trial
has not been served and filed within 180
days of the filing date absence a showing of
23

good cause, the court shall dismiss the case
without prejudice for lack of prosecution.
This rule merely codifies the inherent power of the trial
court to dismiss a case on the court's own motion for lack of
prosecution under Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Meadow

Fresh

Farms

v.

Utah

State

University,

Debt.

of

Agriculture. 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah App. 1991).
In the instant case, no certificate of readiness for trial
had been served or filed at the time of the dismissal order,
which was four

years

and two months

after the action was filed.

The trial court was certainly within its discretion in determining that dismissal for failure to prosecute was indicated based
solely on the length of time the action had been pending in the
discovery stage. The intent of Rule 4-103 is stated in the rule
itself:

"To reduce the time between case filing and disposi-

tion."

If trial judges are expected to enforce this rule to

comply with the intent of the rule, they must be allowed the
discretion to enforce the rule in egregious cases such as this
one.
Our courts have consistently upheld the reasonable discretion of the judge to dismiss actions for failure to prosecute.
Meadow Fresh Farms Inc. v. Utah State Univ. , 813 P. 2d 1216 (Utah
App. 1991) (Timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside dismissal was
properly denied in view of plaintiff's delays); Maxfield v.
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App.), cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah
1989)

(Delay

similar to the

instant
24

case held

to

justify

dismissal for failure to prosecute); Charlie Brown Constr. Co,
Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc. , 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987)
(Numerous delays justified dismissal for failure to prosecute on
the trial court's own motion).
The trial court was entitled to conclude that plaintiffs'
excuses failed to establish good cause why the action should not
be dismissed.

Instead of dismissing the action at the first

order to show cause hearing on February 22, 1991, the court
granted plaintiffs' request to continue the hearing 45 days for
certification
dismissed.

or

in

the

alternative

the

action

would

be

(Minute Entry of February 22, 1991, R. 218). After

45 days, plaintiffs still had not filed a certification of
readiness for trial. At that point, the trial court was entitled
to conclude that since plaintiffs themselves had moved for a
continuance of 45 days for certification or dismissal, and since
plaintiffs did not file the certification, the only reasonable
conclusion was that the alternative of dismissal should apply.
This is especially true since plaintiffs themselves apparently
moved for the 45-day continuance on those terms or at least
acquiesced in the terms. Up

to

the

time

of

the

dismissal,

plaintiffs filed no affidavit or memorandum explaining why they
had not complied with the requirement to file certification of
readiness for trial within 45 days after the hearing of February
22, 1991, or face dismissal.

The trial judge had nothing in

front of him to indicate that plaintiffs had any ground for
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opposing dismissal, or for that matter, that plaintiffs even
intended to oppose dismissal at that point.
Much later, defendants' counsel filed an affidavit dated
February 18, 1992, in which he stated that he served plaintiffs'
first set of interrogatories and request
documents

to

defendants

on

March

29,

certificate of service on the same date.

for production of
1991,

and

filed

a

He argues that this

outstanding discovery amounted to good cause why the action
should

not

have

been

dismissed

for

failure

to prosecute.

However, the court record does not contain any certificate of
service or other evidence of plaintiffs filing such discovery
requests. On that basis, there was no way the trial judge could
have had notice or knowledge of plaintiffs' belated discovery
attempts at the time the judge dismissed the action for failure
to prosecute. A review of the court records shows that the last
written discovery requests filed by plaintiffs were request for
production of documents dated March 16, 1989, almost two years
earlier.

(R. 183-184).

Rule 4-502(1), Code of Judicial Administration, provides
that parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34, and 3 6
shall file in the court record the original certificate of
service stating that the discovery requests have been served on
the other parties and the date of service.

Since plaintiffs did

not file any such certificate of service, the trial judge was
deprived of notice of the discovery requests which the procedure
for

filing

certificates

of

service
26

is designed

to afford.

Consequently, the only reasonable conclusion by the trial judge
was that no discovery had been filed. Plaintiffs' argument that
the pending discovery requests amounted to good cause why the
action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, rings
hollow in the face of plaintiffs' own failure to file the
required certificate of service to place the trial judge on
notice of the discovery.
Plaintiffs did in fact serve interrogatories and requests
for production of documents to defendants by mail on March 29,
1991,

as

plaintiffs'

attorney

asserted

in

his

affidavit.

However, the point is that the trial judge had no way of knowing
this because plaintiffs did not file in the court record the
certificate of service or any other notice that the discovery
requests had been served on counsel.
Even if the trial judge had been notified by plaintiffs that
they had served discovery requests on March 29, 1991, the trial
judge would have been entitled to conclude that this fact did not
constitute good cause why the action should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.

The affidavit of plaintiffs' attorney

confirms that at the hearing on February 22, 1991, he represented
to the court that he believed he could have the case ready for
certification in 45 days.

Then by his own admission he delayed

35 days until March 29, to serve by mail discovery requests which
under their own terms were not due for a response for another 33
days (Rule 33(a) and Rule 34(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure),
a total of 68 days, which was 23 days or over three weeks beyond
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the extension of 45 days granted by the trial judge at the
hearing of February 22 and apparently agreed to by plaintiffs'
counsel at that hearing. Plaintiffs have offered no explanation
of why they delayed 35 days after the hearing before initiating
the discovery requests, or why they failed to inform the trial
judge of the circumstances at any time before the case was
dismissed.
These delays may not seem excessive in themselves, but when
added to the totality of the circumstances, they show that the
trial court acted within the scope of his discretion when he
dismissed. The action had been pending in discovery for four
years and two months, and plaintiffs themselves had failed to
comply with the requirement that they file a certificate of
readiness of trial within 45 days after the February 22 hearing
or face dismissal for failure to prosecute.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have deprived this Court of jurisdiction over
their Rule 60 motions by their failure to file timely appeal from
the order of October 1, 1991, denying the motion to set aside
dismissal.
The order denying the motion to set aside dismissal from
which this appeal was taken was within the broad range of
discretion afforded to the trial court under the circumstances.
This

Court

should

dismiss

the

appeal

for

lack

of

jurisdiction or affirm the order denying the second motion to set
aside dismissal.
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DATED this

%

day of

, 1993.

Bullock
Victoria K. Kidman
Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellees
203687nh

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this
day of

4t±

1993.

L. Zane Gill
Law Office of L. Zane Gill, P.C.
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

A.

Order to Show Cause (February 5, 1991)

(R. 216-17).

B.

Minute Entry (February 22, 1991)

(R. 218).

C.

Certificate of Service of Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendants
(March 29, 1991) (from defendants' file.
Not filed or found in court record).

D.

Order of Dismissal (April 22, 1991)

(R. 219-20).

E.

Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal (dated May 3, 1991; filed
May 6, 1991)

(R. 221-26).

Defendants' Objection to Plaintiff's Motion
To Set Aside Order of Dismissal (dated
May 6, 1991; filed May 8, 1991)

(R. 227-29).

F.

G.

Notice to Submit for Decision, (dated
September 3, 1991; filed September 5, 1991)

(R. 232-33).

H.

Minute Entry (September 6, 1991)

(R. 234).

I.

Order Denying Motion to Set Aside
Dismissal (October 1, 1991)
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal (dated February 18, 1992; filed
February 25, 1992)

J.

K.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal

(R. 235-36).
(R. 237-38).

(R. 239-46).

L.

Affidavit of L. Zane Gill

(R. 247-51),

M.

Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal (March 2, 1992)

(R. 252-55)

N.

Minute Entry (May 13, 1992)

(R. 256).

0.

Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set
Aside Order of Dismissal (May 28, 1992)

(R. 259-60)

Notice of Appeal (dated June 22, 1992;
filed June 24, 1992)

(R. 261-62)

P.

A. Order to Show Cause
(February 5, 1991)
(R. 216-17)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PHELPS ARLENE P., et al.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO.
Plaintiff(s).
VS.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al.

CIVIL NO. 870901394 CV
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant(s).

On it's own motion, the Court orders the parties in this
case appear before the Court on: Friday, 02/22/91 at 08:30 AM,
and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute.
Failure to appear will be considered aquiescence in entry
of an order of dismissal without further notice.
Dated this

5th day of Februagsgr, 1992

I certify that on <Q^/ ^/c\\f 1 mailed a copy of the
order to show cause to:
SEE

A T T A C H M E N T

O-fo

DEPUTY CLERK

0216

A T T A C H M E N T
GILL, L. ZANE
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
50 WEST BROADWAY
SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101

BULLOCK, ROGER H.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
6TH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDIN
9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84111

BRYANT, DAVID F
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
50 WEST BROADWAY
SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101

0217

B. Minute Entry
(February 22, 1991)
(R. 218)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
PHELPS ARLENE P.
PLAINTIFF
VS
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO.

CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV
DATE 02/22/91
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING;
PRESENT:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

P. ATTY. GILL, J.. ZANE
D. ATTY.

BASED ON THE MOTION OF COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF, THE COURT
ORDERS THE COURT'S OWN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BE CONTINUED 45 DAYS
FOR CERTIFICATION OR BE DISMISSED.

0218

C. Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First
Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Defendants
(March 29, 1991) (from defendants' file.
Not filed or found in court record).

>/f^/

L. Zane Gill (3716)
David F. Bryant (5672)
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)364-1046
FAX: (801)364-2511

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and RONALD L.
CARLSON,,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., a New
York Corporation; JAMES FARNER;
DENNIS MORSE; BLAINE TAYLOR;
DIANE BOYD; RICHARD CONNELL;
THEODORE PIPER; DAN NELSON;
ROBERT PARK and GENE KOFORD,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET
OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS

Civil No. C87-1394
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
The above-named attorney for Plaintiffs, L. ZANE GILL
of L. ZANE GILL, P.C, hereby certifies that on the date signed
below, he caused to be served upon Defendants' counsel, Roger
Bullock and Victoria Kidman of STRONG & HANNI, at Sixth Floor
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS.

DATED this

(S '

day of March, 1991.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.

L.vZan£ Gill
David/F. Bryant
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that on the ^/
day of March, 1991,
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, irTthe U.S. Mails an
original copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO
DEFENDANTS to the following:
Roger H. Bullock
Victoria K. Kidman
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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D. Order of Dismissal
(April 22, 1991)
(R. 219-20)

APR 2 2 1991
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTfr.L^.

V^

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PHELPS ARLENE P., et al.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff(s)
VS.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al.

CIVIL NO. 870901394 CV
HON. J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant(s)

The Court having ordered the parties in this case appear
on February

22, 1991 and show cause why the case should not be

dismissed for failure to prosecute, and the parties having
failed to appear, I T IS ORDERED, that this case is dismissed
without prejudice.
Dated this 22nd day of April, 1991.
BY THH COURT

m&$

RICT
I certify that on )-] /3f3/£{[r

5GE,

I mailed a copy of the

order of dismissal to:
SEE

A T T A C H M E N T

H^x
DEPUTY CLERK
0219

VuiyCte*

A T T A C H M E N T
GILL, L. ZANE
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 WEST BROADWAY
SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101

BULLOCK, ROGER H.
Attorney for Defendant
6TH FLOOR BOSTON BUILDIN
9 EXCHANGE PLACE
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84111

BRYANT, DAVID F
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 WEST BROADWAY
SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 84101

0220

E. Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal (dated May 3, 1991;
filed May 6, 1991)
(R. 221-26)

H« 6 II 3" W '?!
ir.'.' - ;
0
N
^

'E n l c T

L. Zane Gill (3716)
Law Office of
L. ZANE GILL
A Utah Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2600
FAX:"(801) 355-2606

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,

]
Plaintiffs,

vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al,

;i
|
]|

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
TO SET ASIDE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL

]
)

Civil No.

C87-1394

Defendants.
1

Judge Frederick

The plaintiffs move the court through their counsel for
an order setting aside the order of dismissal signed by the court
on April 22, 1991.

This motion is made based upon Rule 60(b) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4-103 of the Code of Judicial Administration Operation of the Courts - allows the court as a function of its
civil calendar management to dismiss a case without prejudice for
lack of prosecution if a certificate of readiness has not been
served and filed within 180 days of the commencement of the action.
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This authority is subject to a defense of good cause. In addition,
Rule 4-104(4)(5) restricts a party from filing a certificate of
readiness for trial in cases in which discovery is not complete
prior to filing the certificate.
Rule 60(a) allows relief from judgments or orders where
clerical mistakes or other errors arising
omission are made.

from oversight or

In addition, Rule 60(b) provides for relief

from a judgment or order in the event of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise

or

excusable

neglect.

Based

upon

the

following

discussion, the order of dismissal in this case should be set
aside.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is closely related to a parallel federal action
with the same heading which is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.

This action states causes of action for state

common law claims related to the wrongful termination of the
plaintiffs from their employment at Sears Roebuck & Company in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Very little was done under this state action

while the federal action was being litigated.

Orders in the

federal court allowed depositions taken in either action to be used
in the federal case.

The parallel federal case was aggressively

litigated and prepared for trial. The Honorable Judge Sam granted
2
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the defendants' motions for summary judgment leading the plaintiffs
to appeal that decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals where
it is now pending.
On October 5, 1990, counsel for the plaintiffs moved the
court for a scheduling and management conference, pursuant to Rule
16(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. At that time, counsel
requested a scheduling and management conference in order to set
time lines for the completion of any outstanding discovery, the
filing and hearing of motions, the possibility of facilitating a
settlement, and

for

such other matters

as may

aid

in the

disposition of the case. By minute entry dated October 11, 1990,
the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling and
management conference.

The court indicated that pertinent dates

would be set upon receipt of a certification of readiness for
trial.
Counsel for the plaintiff focused upon preparation of the
briefing in the Tenth Circuit Appeal and no further discovery was
conducted until after receiving an order to show cause in this
action dated February 5, 1991. At the hearing held on February 22,
1991<r counsel for plaintiffs represented to the court that he
believed he could have the case ready for certification in 45 days
in the event no further discovery was necessary.

In reviewing the

files, pursuant to that representation, counsel for the plaintiffs
3
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noticed that several items of discovery which had previously been
requested in the federal action and which were pertinent to the
issues in the state action had not been provided by the defendants.
Accordingly, counsel for plaintiffs prepared and served plaintiffs'
first

set of

interrogatories

and request

for production of

documents to the defendants to cover unanswered requests from the
federal case and certain new items pertinent to the preparation for
trial in this matter. Those discovery requests were served on the
defendants on March 29, 1991. A certificate of service was filed
on the same date.
By the date of receipt of the order of dismissal, April
26r 1991, plaintiffs had heard no response from the defendants one
way or the other.

The order of dismissal was received six days

before the expiration of the response time on the plaintiffs' first
set of interrogatories and request for production of documents to
the defendants.

ARGUMENT
Rule 4-104(5) of the Code of Judicial Administration
provides that any certificate of readiness for trial in a case in
which the discovery is not complete prior to filing the certificate
may be stricken.

Recognizing this fact and the fact that certain

"loose ends" needed to be tied down before the case was ready for
4
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certification for trialf plaintiffs' counsel timely served upon
defendants discovery intended to bring the case to completion for
trial.

The case is ready for trial other than these loose ends

which are pending resolution. There have been numerous depositions
taken which will be used in the state court action.

There are

boxes of documents that are pertinent to the state court litigation
which were developed for use in both the federal and state cases
and other than obtaining responses to the now outstanding discovery
requests of the plaintiffs, the case is ready for assignment of a
trial date.
Therefore, good cause exists, under Rule 4-103, to
prevent the involuntary dismissal without prejudice of this action
for

lack of prosecution.

Plaintiffs' counsel

substantially

complied with the order of the court, pursuant to the order to show
cause dated February 5, 1991, took affirmative steps to finally
prepare the case for trial.
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiffs respectfully move
the court to set aside its order of dismissal without prejudice and
allow the case to be set for trial after any outstanding discovery
objections are filed by defendants and resolved and/or defendants
have provided the information requested by the plaintiffs in the
discovery requests of March 29, 1991.

5
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DATED this

3/^
^

^2:

day of Agra: 1991.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.

L. Zane dill

J
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the £T day
of May 1991 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to:
Roger H. Bullock
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^4111

D15:phelpsst.dis
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F. Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion
To Set Aside Order of Dismissal (dated
May 6, 1991; filed May 8, 1991)
(R. 227-29)

DlS^'C^ OOUfT

H/u 8 iC i s AH'91
lh.r

ROGER H. BULLOCK #485
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sears, Morde, Taylor,
Boyd, Connell, Piper,
Nelson and Koford
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

STRICT
HTY

/

BY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS• MOTION TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., a New
York Corporation, JAMES FARNER,
DENNIS MORSE, BLAINE TAYLOR,
DIANE BOYD, RICHARD CONNELL,
THEODORE PIPER, DAN NELSON,
ROBERT PARK, and GENE KOFORD.

Judge Fc-edridc

Defendants.

Defendants Sears Roebuck & Co., James Farner, Dennis
Morse, Blaine Taylor, Diane Boyd, Richard Connell, and Gene Koford,
object to plaintiffs* motion to set aside order of dismissal in
this action.

nv>?7

FACTS
1. Plaintiffs were fired from their jobs as commissioned
sales persons at the Sears store in downtown Salt Lake City on
September 24, 1986, for insubordination and failure to follow work
rules.
2.

In February of 1987, plaintiffs filed this action

against Sears and against present and former managers and fellow
employees, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress,
wrongful discharge, defamation, and racketeering.
3.
United

In November of 1987, plaintiffs filed an action in

states District

Court

for Utah pertaining

to the same

factual claims of harassment and employment discharge which they
also assert in the instant action, but seeking relief for alleged
sex discrimination and age discrimination in violation of federal
law.

In August of 1990, Judge David Sam granted summary judgment

for Sears on all claims in the United States District Court action.
Plaintiffs1 appeal is now pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
4.

The instant action was dismissed by this court on

April 22, 1991. Plaintiffs seek to revive this action by a Rule 60
motion for relief from the dismissal.
5.

The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on

this motion and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal

1 OOT 1 «

Cm
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absent an abuse of discretion.

Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52

(Utah 1984); Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).
ARGUMENT
Under all the circumstances, the dismissal for failure to
prosecute should stand.

If the court grants plaintiffs' motion to

set aside the order of dismissal, it should do so with respect to
defendant Sears only, and not as to the several co-employees who
apparently were sued out of spite.
DATED this

C? day of May, 1991
STRONG &

H.^BulloiF
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this { ~ day of May,
1991, to:
L. Zane Gill
Attorney at Law
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs
/
11

/

/
/

/
•

"
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G. Notice to Submit for Decision, (dated
September 3, 1991; filed September 5, 1991)
(R. 232-33)
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L. Zane Gill (3716)
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and RONALD L.
CARLSON,

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

Plaintiffs,

SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., a New
York corporation; JAMES FARNER;
DENNIS MORSE; BLAINE TAYLOR;
DIANE BOYD; RICHARD CONNELL;
THEODORE PIPER; DAN NELSON;
ROBERT PARK and GENE KOFORD,

Civil No. C87-1394
Judge Frederick

Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record,
and pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4501(1)(d), hereby submit their notice to submit to the judge for
decision their Motion to set Aside Order of Dismissal submitted
to this court on May 3, 1991.
DATED this

5///

day of September, 1991.
L. ZANEGJLL, P.C.
*2**J>,
L. Zajaes^Gill

CL23C

C E R T I F I C A T E

OF

S E R V I C E

I hereby certify that on the ?SKS3P> day of September,
1991f I caused to be deposited in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION,
to the following:
Roger H. Bullock
Victoria K. Kidman
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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H. Minute Entry (September 6, 1991)
(R. 234)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
PHELPS, ARLENE P
PLAINTIFF
VS
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO.

CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV
DATE 09/06/91
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK JAB

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 1991 THE COURT
RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS
DENIED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN MOVANT'S MOTION AND THE
OBJECTION THERETO. THE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF PER RULE 60(B)
U.R.C.P. IS INSUFFICIENT AS NO SUPPORT AFFIDAVIT IS SUBMITTED.
2. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT'S IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
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I. Order Denying Motion to Set Aside
Dismissal (October 1, 1991)
(R. 235-36)

Third ^u'csai 0!„inct

OCT - 1 J99J
ROGER H. BULLOCK #485
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sears, Morse, Taylor
Boyd, Connell, Piper,
Nelson and Koford
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

By.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,

]
I

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., a New
York Corporation, JAMES FARNER,
DENNIS MORSE, BLAINE TAYLOR,
]
DIANE BOYD, RICHARD CONNELL,
]
THEODORE PIPER, DAN NELSON,
i
ROBERT PARK, and GENE KOFORD.
i
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-1394
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the order of dismissal
entered in this action on April 22, 1991, having come duly before
the court, and the court having reviewed the pleadings and file
materials and being fully advised in the premises and good cause
therefore appearing,

10193*

02?r*

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that
plaintiffs' motion to set aside order of dismissal be and is
denied.
DATED this JY

day of ^apfeefliSer, 1991.
BY THEnCOURT:

Disyriipt
CERTIFICATE OFMAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this / /

day of

September, 1991, to:
L. Zane Gill
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

#x>
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J. Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal (dated February 18, 1992;
filed February 25, 1992)
(R. 237-38)

• /o.:

^ C
'
M

^
^

L. Zane Gill (3716)
Law Office of
L. ZANE GILL
A Utah Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephones (801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al,
Civil No. C87-1394
Defendants.
Judge Frederick
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order
Of Dismissal

Plaintiffs move the court through their counsel for an
order setting aside the order of dismissal signed by the court on
April 22, 1991.

This motion is made based upon Rule 60(b)(7) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4-104(4) & (5) of the Utah
Code

of

Judicial

Administration,

and

is

supported

by

accompanying affidavit and memorandum.
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the

DATED this

(<

day of February 1992.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A

A

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
day of
February 1992 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to:
Roger H. Bullock
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah

DH 09:AP-60b.mol
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K. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion U' ' ' \side Order of Dismissal
46)

L. Zane Gill
lb)
Law Office o
L. ZANE GILL
A Utah Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
ARLENE
RONALD

PHELPS and
Plaintiffs,

vs „
SEARS ROEBUCK AND I'O

,M" all
:ii/¥ i ] No

C87-1394

Defendants
J udge Frederick
Memorandum i.u Support Of Plai n 1:::I ffs'
Motion To Set Aside Order Of Di sm i ssal
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DATED t h i s

ZMIE GILL, P . C .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
V^-T

day of
The u n d e r s i g n e d 1 lereby c e r t i f i e s t h a t on t h e
F ebruary 1992 I caused to be ma :i led, postage prepaid, a true and
correct' copy «»f the foregoing to:
Roger H. Bullock
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
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L. Zane Gill (3716)
Law Office of
L. ZANE GILL
A Utah Professional Corporation
Attorney for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,

)
Plaintiffs,

vs.

]

SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al,

;
)

Civil No.

C87-1394

Defendants.
1

Judge Frederick

Affidavit of L. Zane Gill
STATE OF UTAH

)
) SS.

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE )

I, L. Zane Gill, having been duly sworn, state as follows:

1. Plaintiffs had good cause for not filing a certificate of
readiness within

180 days of commencement

of the action as

discovery was not yet complete.

0?4T

2. This case is closely related to a parallel federal action
with the same heading which is now on appeal to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals,
3.

This action states causes of action for state common law

claims related to the wrongful termination of the plaintiffs from
their employment at Sears Roebuck & Company in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
4.

Very little was done under this state action while the

federal action was being litigated.
5.

Orders in the federal court allowed depositions taken in

either action to be used in the federal case.
6.

The parallel federal case was aggressively litigated and

prepared for trial.
7.

The Honorable Judge Sam granted the defendants' motions

for summary judgment leading the plaintiffs to appeal that decision
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals where it is now pending.
8.

On October 5f 1990, counsel for the plaintiffs moved the

court for a scheduling and management conference, pursuant to Rule
16(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
9.

On October 5, 1990, counsel requested a scheduling and

management conference in order to set time lines for the completion
of any outstanding discovery, the filing and hearing of motions,
the possibility of facilitating a settlement, and for such other
2
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matters as may aid in the disposition of the case.
10. By minute entry dated October 11, 1990, the court denied
the plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling and management conference.

11.

The court indicated that pertinent dates would be set

upon receipt of a certification of readiness for trial.
12. Counsel for the plaintiff focused upon preparation of the
briefing in the Tenth Circuit Appeal and no further discovery was
conducted until after receiving an order to show cause in this
action dated February 5, 1991.
13.

At the hearing held on February 22, 1991, counsel for

plaintiffs represented to the court that he believed he could have
the case ready for certification in 45 days in the event no further
discovery was necessary.
14.

In reviewing the files, pursuant to that representation,

counsel for the plaintiffs noticed that several items of discovery
which had previously been requested in the federal action and which
were pertinent to the issues in the state action had not been
provided by the defendants.
15.

Accordingly, counsel for plaintiffs prepared and served

plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories and request for production
of documents to the defendants to cover unanswered requests from
the federal case and certain new items pertinent to the preparation
3
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for trial in this matter.
16. Those discovery requests were served on the defendants on
March 29, 1991.
17.

A certificate of service was filed on the same date.

18.

By the date of receipt of the order of dismissal, April

26, 1991, plaintiffs had heard no response from the defendants one
way or the other.
19.

The order of dismissal was received six days before the

expiration of the response time on the plaintiffs' first set of
interrogatories and request for production of documents to the
defendants.

DATED this

i?^

day of February 1992.
L. ZANSLGILL, P.C.

J

;M-

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

1992.

day of

(•

IUUUL&L
' NOTARY PUBLIC
Resides in Salt Lake City
My Commission Expires:
uEANNAV M ^>
-15 South Gtato n
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 a
My Commission Expires B
December 3,19§5
I

State of Jtah

J.

0250

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,^t

1

The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /0
day of
February 1992 I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
orrect copy of the foregoing to:
Roger H. Bullock
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah &H?11

DH 09:AP-60b.mel
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M. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order
of Dismissal (March 2, 1992)
(R. 252-55)

£& ^

**fc

ROGER H. BULLOCK, #0485
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,

DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER
I OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al.,

i Civil No. C87-1394

Defendants.

i Judge Frederick

Defendants, through counsel, submit the following memorandum
in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Order of
Dismissal dated February 18, 1992.
FACTS
1.

This court had ordered this action dismissed for

failure to prosecute on April 22, 1991.
2.

On May 3, 1991, plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside

the order of dismissal, urging that Rule 60(b) provides for
relief from a judgment or order in the event of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.

[This specific

reference is to Rule 60(b)(1).]
201628nh
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3. This court denied plaintiffs1 motion to set aside the
order of dismissal by minute entry dated September 6, 1991, and
by written order entered shortly thereafter.
4.

Plaintiffs have now filed a second Rule 60(b) motion

dated February 18, 1992, making essentially the same arguments
they made in May of 1991. However, plaintiffs characterize their
motion as a motion under Rule 60(b)(7) for relief based on "any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment."
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS MOTION IS FILED TOO LATE, RULE 60(b)(1)
MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN THREE MONTHS,
AND PLAINTIFFS CANNOT AVOID THAT RULE BY
MISCHARACTERIZING THE MOTION AS BASED ON "ANY
OTHER REASON" UNDER RULE 60(b)(7).
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is mandatory that
motions for relief from a judgment or order on the ground of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, enumerated
under (b)(1) of the rule, must be made within not more than three
months after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or
taken.

This motion comes ten months after the order of dismissal

for failure to prosecute.

Plaintiffs filed essentially the same

motion in May of 1991, which the court denied in September, 1991.
Even if the current motion is viewed as a motion for relief from

201628nh
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the order of September, 1991, the current motion is barred by the
three-month time requirement.
Subdivision (b)(7) may not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period where the basis for the relief from judgment
is based on grounds within the scope of Subdivision (b)(1).
Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977); Calder Bros. Co. v.
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982); Gardiner and Gardiner Bldrs.
v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d
1193 (Utah 1984); Larsen v. Collina 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984).
POINT II.
THE RULES DO NOT PROVIDE FOR SUCCESSIVE RULE
60 MOTIONS.
There is no provision in Rule 60 for separate, successive
motions on essentially the same grounds. To allow this motion
would allow plaintiffs the luxury of refiling their motion for
reconsideration as many times as necessary until they might
persuade the court.
POINT III.
IN ANY EVENT, THIS MOTION WAS NOT MADE WITHIN
A REASONABLE TIME.
Even assuming that this motion is not barred because of the
three-month time requirement, and assuming that the standard
should be the requirement that the motion be made within a
reasonable time, plaintiffs have offered no explanation about why
it has taken them ten months to file this motion following the
201628nh
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court's order of dismissal.

In Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Century

Cas. Co -, 621 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1980), the Tenth Circuit
affirmed a denial of Rule 60 relief where there was no showing of
reasons for delay in seeking relief for 115 days after the order
complained of.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, plaintiffs1 current motion to set
aside order of dismissal should be denied.
Dated this

2—

,/^z

day of /^/CtAjtsU^

1992.

STRONG &

.lock
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was hand delivered this &

n

day of

. 1992, to:
L. Zane Gill
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

KjldL^
201628nh
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N. Minute Entry (May 13, 1992)
(R. 256)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
PHELPS, ARLENE P
PLAINTIFF
VS
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO.
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 870901394 CV
DATE 05/13/92
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK CLB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND REQUEST FOR HEARING DATED
MAY 8, 1992, THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS:
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS
DENIED FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM IN
RESPONSE THERETO.
2. PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS DENIED.
3. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS IS TO PREPARE THE APPROPRIATE
ORDER.

0256

O. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Set
Aside Order of Dismissal (May 28, 1992)
(R. 259-60)

FilEOmSTmeT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 2 8 1992

ROGER H. BULLOCK, #0485
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080

A

By

SALUAKECOWY

U^jQ

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs,
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-1394
Judge Frederick

Plaintiffs1 motion dated February 18, 1992, to set
aside the order of dismissal in this action having come duly
before the court, Hon. J. Dennis Frederick presiding, and the
court having reviewed the record and file materials, including
the memorandum and affidavit in support of the motion and
defendants1 memorandum in opposition, and the court finding that
a hearing is not required pursuant to Rule 4-501(3), Code of
Judicial Administration, and the court being fully advised in the
premises and good cause therefore appearing,

3/104047
1145.568

f

* ??'.'<

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
plaintiffs1 request for oral argument is denied and plaintiffs1
motion dated February 18, 1992, to set aside order of dismissal
be and is denied.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was mailed postage prepaid this

Jy^

day of

May, 1992, to:
L. Zane Gill
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Aw^M/w

3/10WJ47
1145.568
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P. Notice of Appeal (dated June 22, 1992;
filed June 24, 1992)
(R. 261-62)

FILED
OloTRlCT COUR"1

9 25AH'fc

JUN?4

L. Zane Gill (3716)
Law Office of
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
215 South State, Suite 545
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-2600
FAX: (801) 355-2606

run.
SAL 1 t -

. Ui'TRlCT
•

vflUNTY.

J__\___

BY

in i i l { CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARLENE P. PHELPS and
RONALD L. CARLSON,

]
Plaintiffs,

]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
'
i

Civil No. C87-1394

vs.
SEARS ROEBUCK AND CO., et al,
Defendants.

Judge Frederick

±
Notice is hereby given that Arlene P. Phelps and Ronald
L. Carlson, above-named plaintiffsf do hereby appeal to the Utah
Supreme

Court

from

judgment

entered

May

28,

1992

denying

plaintiffs' motion to set aside order of dismissal and request for
oral argument.
DATED this JZ^

day of June 1992.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

M.

/

I hereby certify that on the JL9 * day of June 1992, I
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to:
Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANNI
6th Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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